Abstract
Introduction
The notion of aggregate signature is introduced by Boneh et al., [1] , which allows an efficient algorithm to aggregate n signatures of n distinct messages from n different users into one single signature. The result aggregate signature can convince the verifier that n different users did indeed sign n distinct messages. This primitive has many applications where storage or bandwidth is restricted, and thus one wants to reduce the total cryptographic overhead.
Boneh et al., presented the first aggregate signature [1] , which was based on BLS siganture [2] in groups with bilinear maps. Subsequently, Lysyanskaya et al. presented a sequential RSA-based scheme [3] that, while more limited, could be instantiated using more general assumptions. In Eurocrypt 2006, Lu et al., proposed another sequential aggregate siganture [4] from Waters signature [5] . A sequential aggregate signature is that signatures can only be aggregated by sequentially passing the aggregate from one signer to the next. However, it is in appropriate for many important applications where signers cannot be conventiently arranged in sequence. Furthermore, the schemes in [1] [2] [3] are proved secure in the random oracle model, only the scheme in [4] is proved secure in the standard model.
In order to eliminate the need for signer interaction, Gentry et al. proposed an aggregate signature scheme [6] where nointeraction between signers was required, provide that all signers have a global strategy for choosing a value  that is used during signing. Only the signature with the same  can be aggregated. This kind of aggregate signature is called synchronized aggregate signature, and Gentry et al., scheme is under CDH assumption in the random oracle model. In CCS 2010, Ahn et al. proposed an novel sychronized aggregate signature [11] based on the stateful signature of Hohenburger and Waters (Eurocrypt 2009) [7] . They define  as a time period. Although their scheme can can be proved secure under exponentiations. The computational cost of pairing is usually considered very heavy. We present a synchronized aggregate signature under Hohenburger and Waters's RSA signature [8] (Crypto 09). Our scheme is provably secure based on the standard RSA assumption in the standard model. Compared with Ahn et al., scheme [11] , our scheme is efficient and without pairing.
In Section 2, we review the standard RSA assumption and define some notations. In Section 3, we review the secure definition of synchronized signature. Section 4 presents the synchronized signature scheme under the standard RSA assumption. Section 5 presents the security analysis to our scheme. Section 6 gives the conclusion.
Preliminary
RSA Assumption. Let  be the security parameter. Let integer n be the product of two  -bits, distinct odd primes , pq . Let e be a randomly chosen positive integer less than and relatively prime to ( ) ( 
Verify(
This algorithm takes in a public key pk , a message M , and a corresponding signature  , and verifies whether σ is a valid signature. If valid, it outputs 1, otherwise 0.
Aggregate(
On input a sequence of public keys 
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Copyright ⓒ 2014 SERSC message. The security definition of aggregate signature is a extension to the normal digital signature, which can be described as a game between a challenger C and an adversary A .
Setup:
The challenger C runs ParaGen(1  ) algorithm to obtain the public parameters p a ra m , then it runs the Setup(1  ) algorithm for N times to obtain N distinct key pairs 
We define
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A to be the probability that the adversary A wins the above game, taken over the coin tosses made by A and the challenger C . 
Definition 2. (Exist Unforgeability) An adversary

Proposed Synchronized Signature Scheme
Our Construction
We now define our new synchronized signature scheme. Our construction is based on the Hohenburger and Waters RSA signature [8] . The drapdoor of our scheme is factorization of integer, so N users in our scheme should have the same modulo n and , pq . Thus, N users have the same secret key
, however, their public keys are partially distinct . 
Efficiency Analysis
Our scheme is practical, since an aggregate signature only requires one element in group of n QR and a small integer. To verify an aggregate of N signatures, requires only one modular exponentiation and one modular N multi-exponentiations. In general, if N is relatively small, the computaional cost of one modular N multi-exponentiations and one modular exponentiation are almost equal. In the following table, we compare our scheme with other aggregate signature schemes in type, assumption, model, aggregate signature size and the computational cost of aggregate verifying.
Copyright ⓒ 2014 SERSC Our scheme can be proved secure under the standard RSA assumption in the standard model, and only requires About 2 modular exponentiations in the aggregate verification (If N is relatively small, the cost of one modular N multi-exponentiations is almost equal to one modular exponentiation). Thus, our scheme is more practical than theirs.
Security Analysis
In this section, we will prove our scheme secure under the standard RSA assumption in the standard model. . Finally, C sends the N public keys We have completed the simulation of the scheme. In the following step, we will analyze the bounded probability of C .
1)
In the Setup step, if C guesses correctly, the probability is 1/q .
2)
In the Setup step, C chooses 1 ,,
, (assume qp   ) which implies that ), the probability is 
4)
In the Forgery step, since 1 ,, N  are hidden from the adversary's view, the probability of
Putting the above together, we get that We have completed the simulation of the scheme. In the following step, we will analyze the bounded probability of C .
1)
In the Setup step, if C guesses correctly, the probability is 
4)
In the Forgery step, since 1 ,, N  are hidden from the adversary's view, the probability of Putting the above together, we get that 
Conclusion
An aggregate signature scheme is a digital signature scheme where anyone given N signatures on n messages from N users can aggregate all these signatures into a single short signature. Thus, it is a good candidate for a variety of communication applications where routing flexibility, speed and low bandwidth are needed. For example, in the wireless sensor network(WSN), sensors often run on battery power and must minimize radio communications. Digital signature offer better security properties, but can add significant bandwidth overhead. Aggregate signature can greatly reduce the bandwidth requirements the message signing imposes on WSN. Rather than carry all signature data, intermediate routing nodes can perform signature aggregation at any point where multiple signatures must be routed towards the collector.
In this paper, we propose the first synchronized aggregate signature from the standard RSA assumption without random oracles. It requires that signers have access to a synchronized clock and only signatures from the same period can be aggregated. Compared with Ahn et al.'s construction, our scheme is efficient, and needs not compute pairings in the aggregate verification.
